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**Democrats without Democracy? Linkage and Socialization into
Democratic Governance in Authoritarian Regimes**

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Studies on the diffusion of norms generally argue that strong ties between transition countries and established democracies decisively foster political transformation. In doing so, they take for granted that agent attitudes and preferences are (re-)shaped by exposure to norms, but fail to empirically scrutinize this socialization effect. External democratization by linkage has so far only been explored at the aggregate level of states and on transition countries already moving ahead with democracy. This paper aims at filling this lacuna by examining whether linkage to 'the West' transfers democratic rules and practices into Arab authoritarian regimes hitherto resistant to political liberalization. It explores whether social and communication ties to established democracies can create important domestic stakeholders for democratic change by transforming state officials into democrats within a non-democratic polity. In order to directly examine attitudes rather than infer them from behavior, an original scale has been developed that measures the degree of agreement with democratic norms of governance. Empirically, the argument is tested on Morocco's linkage to Europe using data from a unique survey among state officials. The results challenge the linkage models' assumption that attitudes are shaped by exposure to norms.

Key words: Arab authoritarian regimes; democratic governance; democratization; European Union; linkage; public administration; international socialization

Introduction

After the implosion of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world have been overthrown and replaced, albeit more or less successfully and sustainably, by democratic forms of government. However, this 'wave of democratization' has missed the Middle East and North Africa. According to Freedom House data, the Arab countries as a whole are not only the world's least free region; they have also not liberalized politically for more than fifteen years now. At the same time, these countries developed strong ties to Western democracies. The relationships encompass various linkages such as economic flows of investment and assistance, transgovernmental ties to policy networks, penetration by Western media, and social linkages including elite education and migration. These linkages are said to raise not only the cost of authoritarianism by denouncing autocratic abuses, increasing pressure on Western countries to intervene, and changing domestic opportunity structures in favor of pro-democratic forces. They may also influence the preferences of domestic actors turning them into democrats within a predominantly non-democratic environment (Levitsky and Way 2005: 23-5).

However, hitherto this argument has been more theoretically assumed than empirically proven. Whereas some evidence of democratizing effects of linkage at the macro level of regime change could be found by studies comparing the trajectories of post-Cold War Central Europe, the Americas, East Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa, the stated effect of linkage as influencing authoritarian regimes by 'creating domestic stakeholders in democracy' (Levitsky and Way 2005: 24) has not been empirically scrutinized. Studies so far not only focus on transition countries already moving ahead with democracy and neglect authoritarian regimes such as Arab countries hitherto reluctant toward change. By concentrating on processes at the polity level, they also overlook more subtle influences that may occur within state administration.

This paper examines the effect of linkage to Western democracies on preferences of domestic actors. To this end, it concentrates on the attitude toward democratic governance of Arab state officials as relevant actors for democratic change at the intermediate level between government and society. Whereas the repressive character of a third state's political system may have hitherto prevented behavioral changes, state officials employed by authoritarian regimes could still transform into democrats as a consequence of strong social and communication ties to 'the West'. Empirically, the argument is tested on Morocco, which is characterized by strong linkage to Europe using data from a unique survey among 150 state officials employed in different ministries.

Morocco has not shown any noteworthy democratization process in recent decades (e.g., Aliboni and Guazzone 2004, Chourou 2002, Jerch 2004, Panebianco 2006). It can thus be considered to be a problematic case where attitude toward democratic governance by state officials is likely to be negative. At the same time, Morocco presents a most-likely-case within the EU's Southern neighborhood as it is widely referred to as the politically most liberalized country in the region. In addition, the primary source of linkage is geographical proximity to Western democratic countries (Kopstein and Reilly 2000, Levitsky and Way 2005, O'Loughlin *et al.* 1998: 552). Countries located close to the EU like Morocco are generally characterized by a denser web of interaction with European democracies than more geographically distant ones. Consequently, if linkage to Western democratic countries impacts on the attitude of state officials in neighboring authoritarian regimes, then we should be able to detect such an effect in Moroccan ministries. In turn, in case of a negative finding the conclusion is acceptable that in countries politically less liberalized and geographically more distant than Morocco to Europe, linkage will also show no significant effect.

Using exploratory factor analysis, the paper first constructs a scale for measuring attitude toward democratic governance. To this end, a clearly interdisciplinary perspective was adopted by incorporating social psychological approaches to attitude measurement in research on democratization processes. In order to test whether factors identified by the linkage model as spreading democratic values beyond borders indeed trigger democratic socialization, a multiple regression analysis was conducted. The results do not reveal any significant effect of linkage on state officials' attitude toward democratic rules and practices of administrative governance. It seems as if the linkage model's theoretical assumption that transnational relations turn domestic actors into democratic-minded opponents of authoritarian regimes by influencing their preferences and attitudes does not hold empirically.

Linkage and Democratic Socialization: The Theoretical Argument

Studies on diffusion identify subtle mechanisms of 'uncoordinated' (Elkins and Simmons 2005: 35) norm transfer such as 'emulation' (Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 2006: 795-8) and 'contagion' (Whitehead 1996: 5-8) that do not require active a policy that actively promotes democracy. Rather, they are said to diffuse norms through neutral, that is 'non-coercive and often unintentional, channels from one country to another' (Schmitter 1996: 30). In this, linkage serves as a transmitter of international influence by diffusion (Gleditsch 2001: 13). Linkage is a 'multidimensional concept that encompasses the myriad networks of interdepend-

ence that connect individual polities, economies, and societies to Western democratic communities' (Way and Levitsky 2007: 53).¹

The linkage model of external democratization contends that cross-border interactions and transnational exchanges may transfer democratic norms beyond borders into authoritarian regimes where they possibly trigger processes of voluntary democratic change (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008). In this view, democratization is not the result of various instruments and strategies used by external actors to either persuade domestic elites into democratic norms or influence their cost-benefit calculation in favor of democratic change through conditionality. Instead, the effects of linkage are diffuse by creating 'multiple pressure points – from investors to technocrats to voters – that few autocrats can afford to ignore' (Levitsky and Way 2005: 25). To this end, it is assumed that 'linkage shapes the preferences of domestic actors' (Levitsky and Way 2005: 24).

The expected democratizing effect of linkage is rooted in sociologists' insight of the intersubjectivity of meaning: 'both legitimated ends and appropriate means are socially constructed' (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006: 801; e.g., Berger and Luckmann 1966). Exposure to norms, that is interaction and contact, is said to decisively shape preferences and attitudes of individual agents. The linkage model's argument thus follows the 'complex adaptive systems' approach (Cederman 1997: 7), where even small perturbations in the characteristics of individual agents or small groups interacting with each other can have quite dramatic effects on social structures (cf., Johnston 2001: 507). Since such an approach demands the unit of analysis to be the individual (or a small group), it is all the more remarkable that till now studies have been limited to the scrutiny of diffusion processes at the aggregate level of states. In so doing, they take for granted the results of socialization on preferences and attitudes and engage in what Checkel calls 'as if' reasoning (Checkel and Moravcsik 2001: 227). This paper seeks to fill this lacuna. To this end, it puts the linkage models' constructivist argument of preference change due to exposure to norms under the analytic microscope by zooming on democratic socialization processes at the level of individual state officials.

State officials employed by authoritarian regimes are a relevant target group for scrutinizing whether linkage to Western liberal democracies is able to create democratic stakeholders in a non-democratic polity. In contrast to US understanding of democracy promotion that focuses on bottom-up movements driven by civil society, Europeans generally consider such events to be (if at all) the 'prologue' rather than the 'key' to democratization (Kopstein 2006:

¹ Despite all debate on the universalist character of democracy, the concepts of linkage and diffusion predominantly refer to a liberal, Western ideal of democracy. For the applicability of Western bureaucratic management styles to non-Western countries see Vengroff 1994.

87). From their perspective, it is most crucial to ask what kind of regime should replace dictatorship – and thus concentrate on ‘the heavy lifting of creating stable institutions of democratic representation’ (Kopstein 2006: 87) next to establishing market economies and fostering peace. In this regard, state officials play a central role. In order to be fruitful, democratic reforms at the polity level require state officials familiar with democratic modes of governance. Otherwise, democratization processes risk resulting in ‘enlightened dictatorship’ that circumvents rather than allows effective democratic control by the citizens when used by specific classes and oligarchies to control political power and sustain ineffective, corrupt regimes (Baker 2002b: 5, Jreisat 2006). Secondly, as ‘government in action’ (Jreisat 2007) state officials not only formulate and implement policy, but also carry it out. In contrast to the political elite and diplomats, state officials present that part of the public sector with which citizens actually have contact (Baker 2002b: 4, Berger 1957: 5) and thus shape citizens’ ‘perceptions of how a political system functions’ (Hyden, Court and Mease 2004: 21). Finally, state officials themselves constitute a significant social group. In countries like Morocco they represent a large proportion of the educated population and comprise a major part of the (emerging) middle class (Zerhouni 2004: 61), factors commonly seen as social conditions or ‘requisites’ that support democratization (Lipset 1981).

Dimensions of Democratic Socialization

Democratic socialization is defined as the process of attitude change toward democratic governance as a consequence of exposure to democratic rules and decision-making practices.² Drawing on authors who have taken an unconventional view of democracy, the notion of democratic governance corresponds to the manifestation of democratic principles in administrative daily practices. It adopts the idea that democratic principles may be applicable to every situation in which collectively binding decisions are taken (Beetham 1999: 4-5). These principles can thus be translated into administrative rules and practices at the level of subunits of state administration even within a non-democratic polity. Unlike good governance (see, e.g., Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2005), democratic governance is not about how effectively and efficiently but how legitimately ‘the rules of the political game are managed’ (Hyden, Court and Mease 2004: 2).

For the purpose of assessing state officials’ attitude toward democratic modes of decision-making and implementation, a multidimensional concept of democratic governance is used. Democratic governance may vary in quality along three dimensions: transparency, accountability, and participation (Freyburg, Skripka and Wetzel 2007). Although the margins

² This definition largely corresponds to the classical understanding of socialization as a ‘process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community’ (Checkel 2005: 804).

between these dimensions sometimes blur, they are analyzed individually. Transparency is mainly about the provision of, and access to, various kinds of information and regular reports on sectoral policy and its consequences to citizens, civil society associations, and the media. Accountability at the administrative level refers to the obligation for officials to justify their actions toward citizens and independent third parties, and the establishment and application of procedures for administrative review including the possibility of sanctions in case of infringement. Finally, participation means that all willing members of the public should have an 'equal and effective opportunity to make their interests and concerns known' (De la Porte and Nanz 2004: 272).

Democratic modes of governance imply changing the culture of administrative rules and practices in authoritarian regimes where 'bureaucracy has been reduced to a service tool of political leaders rather than a professional institution with special skills for independent analysis and action' (Jreisat 2006: 417). Public participation threatens the state officials' self-conception as being professionals who know the material best and do not want to be bothered by unqualified requests from citizens; transparency directly 'contradicts the fundamental secrecy' of authoritarian regimes where 'information may be an official's only asset' (Zaharchenko and Goldenmann 2004: 229); and accountability poses difficulties for the rigid political authority structure. Acquainted with democratic modes of governance, however, state officials may prefer innovative policy work to administrative routine, thus acquiring room for maneuver allowing pro-active initiatives and competitive career advancement, for instance. Consequently, they may seek to engage in individual and collective strategies to pursue these preferences, that is to implement participatory, accountable and transparent governance styles within state administration in the long run (cf., 'bureau shaping', Dunleavy 1991).

Democratic socialization manifests itself in the change of the socializees' attitude toward democratic governance. While linkage may indeed shape state officials' attitude, it does not necessarily impact their behavior. Behavior and behavioral intentions are thus treated as potential consequences rather than integral components of attitude change itself. Attitudes are understood as 'evaluative dispositions' encompassing affective (i.e. emotion-based) and cognitive (i.e. belief-based) components (Eagly and Chaiken 1992, Olson and Zanna 1993, Verplanken, Hofstee, and Janssen 1998, Zimbardo and Leippe 1991: 31).³ Attitude change thus not only refers to affective change as increased agreement and support, where actors ultimately internalize democratic governance norms so that they 'achieve a "taken-for-

³ The original formulation of multi-component models of attitude comprises three or even four components – affect, cognition, behaviour, and eventually behavioural intentions. Most recent research in this tradition, however, focuses on affect and cognition only.

granted” quality’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 904). It also covers influences at the level of cognition, which means that actors acquire knowledge about democratic governance leading to a change in their ‘factual beliefs’, that is their knowledge about the meaning, prerequisites, performance, and other attributes of democratic administrative rules and practices (Checkel 2005: 24, Zürn and Checkel 2005: 85).

Conditions of Democratic Socialization

Linkage is expected to familiarize individuals with rules and norms incorporated in the corporate identity of the respective socialization entity, in this case Western democracies, and to render them more susceptible to democratic governance. Two dimensions of linkage are assumed to be particularly suitable for shaping state officials’ preferences of certain forms of administrative rules and practices: social linkage and communication linkage. Social linkage is about ‘flows of people across borders’ (Way and Levitsky 2007: 53) – state officials’ understanding of appropriate governance is likely to be influenced by personal experiences made with democratic modes of decision making when staying abroad for educational or professional reasons for a considerable period of time. Officials can also become acquainted with democratic governance at home through communication linkage, that is ‘flows of information across borders’ (Way and Levitsky 2007: 53), via contact with Western media. Media exposure has largely been positively associated with democratization (Wejnert 2005: 56). Cross-tabulation with the non-parametric Kendall’s tau-b rank correlation test reveals that the two linkage variables are not significantly interrelated (for the contingency table see Annex IV). This reasoning culminates in the formulation of the following hypotheses on the impact of linkage.

H1 (social linkage): State officials in authoritarian regimes are more likely to have a positive attitude toward democratic governance when they have stayed abroad for educational or professional reasons in a Western democratic country.

H2 (communication linkage): State officials in authoritarian regimes are more likely to have a positive attitude toward democratic governance when they regularly use Western media for political information.

These influences might be filtered by two domestic factors: the officials’ administrative socialization, and the politicization of their working environment. Officials that entered public administration after reform-oriented forces took government with a spirit of administrative modernization (albeit a moderate one) are expected to demonstrate a more positive attitude toward democratic governance than their senior colleagues. This proposition accounts for

pre-socialization such as 'prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent' with the norms to be transferred (Checkel 2005: 813, Hooghe 2005). Senior officials in particular – as “well-connected” members of the old guard’ (Baker 2002a: 293) – might perceive democratic governance as a real threat to their privileges. Secondly, bureaucrats engaged in ministries whose professional environment is characterized by a low degree of politicization are more likely to be open to democratic influences (Checkel 2005: 813). Politicized issues lie at the ‘pole of power’ (Zimmerman 1973: 1204) evoking threats that are vital to major goals of relevant political decision makers, in particular in the realm of defense, security, and sovereignty. In this regard, they belong to what many call ‘high politics’ in contrast to all other economic, political, and social affairs that are designated ‘low politics’. It is expected that in high politics transfer of democratic governance via transnational channels is unlikely to occur since issues are usually resolved top-down and hierarchically (Potter 1980: 410, Waeber 1995). In less politicized fields, however, components of democratic governance, such as transparency, may appear as part of superior solutions to underlying problems and are more likely to be accepted as appropriate ingredients of decision-making processes. Following these considerations, we should therefore expect that the impact of linkage increases with administrative socialization in a more reform-oriented environment and with relative non-politicization, as is stated by the following hypotheses.

H3 (administrative socialization): Linkage to Western democracies is more likely to impact positively on the attitude toward democratic governance of state officials who entered public administration after reform-minded forces took government.

H4 (politicization): Linkage to Western democracies is more likely to impact positively on the attitude toward democratic governance of state officials who work in a non-politicized policy field.

Measuring Attitude toward Democratic Governance: The Methodological Approach

To measure the attitude toward democratic governance of Moroccan state officials a closed-end questionnaire was constructed and presented as dealing with administrative rules and practices in public administration in general. Comments and alternative answer categories allowing for individual completion indicate that respondents indeed believed this to be the survey’s objective. The risk of response bias was further reduced by guaranteeing anonymity

and strict confidentiality in the use of the data.⁴ The officials were selected by a theoretically controlled cluster sampling: all officials working in particular departments of pre-selected ministries were invited to participate in this original survey. Personal distribution of the questionnaire on site enabled a response rate of approximately 96 per cent; nearly all officials available during a period of three months in the summer of 2008 answered. Due to the opportunity to leave inconvenient questions blank and the persuasive approach taken, outright refusal was almost absent.⁵ Biases due to complete response refusal by specific groups of officials could thus be avoided. Due to this specific and limited target group, the questionnaire was cognitively pre-tested by knowledgeable experts – psychologists and political scientists specialized in Arab authoritarian regimes – and colleagues with Arab migratory background (Collins 2003, Presser *et al.* 2004).

Since this study could not build on existing surveys, it required the creation of suitable democratic governance items. To this end, the three theoretically derived dimensions of democratic governance – transparency, accountability, and participation – were operationalized with issue indicators pertaining to various aspects of administrative governance (see Table 1). Conceptual work on public administration (reform), and linkage of (good) governance and development inspired their formulation (Baker 2002c, Berger 1957, Hyden, Court and Mease 2004, Page 1985). To minimize the risk of response biases these items were randomly distributed in two out of 36 different sets of questions.⁶ Moreover, some of the items were repeated and reformulated in different statements. Using a 5-point Likert scale, which enables a reduction of complex beliefs into straight agree/disagree statements, respondents were asked to indicate whether they ‘strongly agree’ (5), ‘agree’ (4), ‘disagree’ (2) or ‘strongly disagree’ (1) with the given item. A neutral position (3) and the possibility ‘don’t know’ were provided in order to allow for distinction between indifference and abstained responses.⁷ In order to distinguish affective support of democratic governance from cognitive understanding of its meaning, the set of questions covered negatively oriented items that capture statements on non-democratic governance features, and items about good and effective, rather than democratically legitimated, governance.

⁴ Respondents could choose the language of communication (French or Arabic), a gesture that was warmly acknowledged.

⁵ Only one official flatly refused to fill in the questionnaire; fewer than five officials could not be reached because of professional commitments abroad or holidays. It is difficult to test sample bias conclusively because socio-demographic data on state officials in Morocco are not available.

⁶ The two sets of questions were introduced as follows: ‘There are different understandings of what determines the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts in public administration. To what extent do you personally agree that the following items serve this function?’ (item 1+2) / ‘There are different opinions as to what it takes to be a ‘good’ civil servant. To what extent to you personally agree or disagree that a civil servant should have the following qualities?’ (item 3-8).

⁷ Abstained responses (blank and ‘don’t know’ answers) were treated as missing values.

Table 1 lists the eight items pertaining to various aspects of the three proposed dimensions of governance. The items appear as ordered in the questionnaire. The first dimension concerns public participation. Three items address the involvement of non-state actors in administrative decision- and policymaking to different degrees. Item 7 asks whether citizens should have the opportunity to express their interests and concerns; item 3 goes one step further by arguing that these interests and concerns should be taken into account before making decisions, and item 6 postulates that they should actually shape the decisions made. Transparency is covered by three items asking whether civil servants should offer information to everyone by ensuring that it is generally comprehensible (item 5), updated (item 4), and that it corresponds to what is actually requested (item 8). Finally, the third dimension refers to the obligation for civil servants to justify their actions toward the public (item 2) and independent state institutions (item 1).

TABLE 1
THREE DIMENSIONS OF ATTITUDE TOWARD DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

Indicators/items	Factors/dimensions						<i>h</i> ²
	Participation		Transpar- ency		Accountabil- ity		
	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.	
1. 'Monitoring by independent state institutions ensures the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts'					.814***	.203	.653
2. 'Possibilities for the general public and its associations to request scrutiny of the decision-making process and review of policies ensures the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts'					.437*	.176	.205
3. 'A civil servant should take into account the views and concerns of affected citizens before making decisions'	.981***	.104					.873
4. 'A civil servant should offer updated information on governmental policy'	.433**	.168					.386
5. 'A civil servant should work in a manner that is transparent and comprehensible for the general public'			.568**	.186			.476
6. 'A civil servant should ensure that the citizens' views and concerns have an influence on shaping policies'	.644**	.226					.585
7. 'A civil servant should provide citizens with the possibility of advancing their views as an input for governmental decision making'			.459**	.147			.542
8. 'A civil servant should make information available to anyone requesting it'			.878***	.169			.762
	<i>Eigenvalues</i>		1.498	0.868	3.316		
	<i>Variance explained (%)</i>		18.73	10.85	41.45		

Factor loading matrix. *N* = 148; *S.E.* = standard error, *Est.* = factor loading (estimator), *h*² = communality; factor loadings <.30 are not displayed; **p* ≤ .05, ***p* ≤ .01, ****p* ≤ .001.

Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) helps to identify a set of latent variables ('factors') underlying a battery of manifest variables ('indicators') in order to understand their structure of correlations. The indicators assess the degree of agreement with various specific attitude state-

ments, and the factors are understood as the general underlying attitudes. EFA thus helps to examine which of the statement items are most suitable for measuring the three theoretically expected dimensions. The analysis is done with MPlus 5.2 using the robust mean and variance-adjusted weighted least squares (WLSMV) extraction procedure, which is insensitive to non-normal distribution of categorical items and appropriate for small samples (Brown 2006: 388).⁸ The oblique rotation method Oblimin is used due to the theoretically expected factor inter-correlation. Careful analysis of the correlation matrix reveals that democratic governance items highly correlate with each other and can be retained in the analysis. The individual Measure of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) values of the selected 8 items range from .795 to .505 with $M = .668$, which supports their retention. Moreover, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test of sampling adequacy meets with .676 the benchmark (Worthington and Whittaker 2006: 832).

EFA substantiates that state officials' attitude toward democratic governance can be conceptualized along the three dimensions participation (factor I), transparency (II) and accountability (III). Scree test, Horn's parallel analysis, and replication of factor analysis with halves of randomly split data set verified the existence of three latent variables (Costello and Osborne 2005, Fabrigar *et al.* 1999, Fürntratt 1969: 64, Thompson 2004: 31-6).⁹ Each factor, or dimension, is defined by the items that load most heavily on it. Table 1 displays item factor loadings (Est.) of at least .30. Their standard errors are taken into account by conducting significance tests for loadings (Cudeck and O'Dell 1994): all included factor loadings are (highly) significant.

The generated model has a good fit. The absolute fit indices – such as an insignificant Chi-square value at a .05 threshold ($\chi^2 = 6.313$; $df = 6$; $p = .3890$) and a standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) of .035 – meet the required standards (Hooper, Coughlan and Mullen 2008, McIntosh 2007). The Comparative Fit Index (CFI) of .999 as an incremental fit index is also very close to the 1.0 benchmark (Hooper, Coughlan and Mullen 2008, Hu and Bentler 1999). Moreover, replication of EFA on two separate randomly split sub-samples (75 per cent of cases each) shows same pattern of loadings for both validation samples and as EFA using a full sample. The total variance explained by the three factors is 71.03 per cent.

The first factor – participation – captures one of the key dimensions in the conventional understanding of democracy (Dahl 1971, Verba 1967). It is traditionally perceived as the involvement of the rule addressees in the rule-making process (item 6). In this sense, partici-

⁸ Assumption of multivariate normality is violated as shown by skewness and kurtosis of measured variables and confirmed with significant Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests; for three out of 8 items (3, 5 and 8) violation is severe (skewness > 2; kurtosis > 6.5).

⁹ The findings are robust across alternative methodologies. Replications with the oblique rotation Geomin and the orthogonal rotation Varimax produce the same pattern of factor loadings.

pation not only requires that state officials seek to guarantee citizens' knowledge about current governmental decisions in order to enable meaningful participation (item 4). It first and foremost presumes that state officials are willing to admit non-state actors representing all relevant interests to their decision-making processes (items 3). Transparency as access to information for citizens means that governance-related information about administrative procedures is provided (item 5), and that instead of pre-prepared promotion packages of governmental policy, up-to-date and comprehensive information that is actually demanded is available (items 8). Finally, accountability refers to 'reviews [of] the expediency and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts' (Schedler 1999: 28). This can be done either by means of independent state institutions ('horizontal accountability', item 1) or by possibilities for citizens and their associations to request scrutiny of administrative practices ('vertical accountability', items 2).

Correlation between the factors demonstrates that although the three dimensions of democratic governance present factors on their own, they are interdependent. In particular, a positive attitude toward participation implies at least a partially positive attitude toward accountability ($r = .554$; $p = .000$, two-tailed). This is intuitively plausible because some of the accountability mechanisms imply involvement of the public (item 2). Factor inter-correlation of transparency with participation ($r = .284$; $p = .110$, two-tailed) and with accountability ($r = .036$; $p = .816$, two-tailed), respectively, is not significant. Nevertheless, loadings other than expected and (though insignificant) item cross-loading point to the relatedness of participation and transparency. Eventually, transparency as access to information is necessary to enable meaningful participation (item 4). Conversely, participation enhances transparency. Item 7 loads on both dimensions though less high and insignificantly on participation ($r = .299$; $p = .126$, two-tailed). In principle, however, the three dimensions form single factors as shown by relative unidimensionality, that is, the squared loading/squared communalities ratio of the two items that load highest on a factor differs to at least .25 (Fürntratt 1969: 66).¹⁰

The three generated factors – participation, transparency, and accountability – allow measurement of attitudes toward democratic governance. To what extent do state officials in authoritarian regimes agree with democratic principles of administrative governance? And does linkage to Western democracies have an influence on this?

¹⁰ The only exception is item 7, for which the difference is 22 per cent due to the mentioned cross-loading.

Linkage to Europe and Attitude toward Democratic Governance: Empirical Evidence

Morocco presents a suitable case for examining the effect of linkage to Western democracies on the attitude toward democratic governance of state officials employed by authoritarian regimes. As a bureaucratic monarchy it is characterized by traditional paternalistic structures, which attach great importance to state bureaucracy for the maintenance and stability of the current regime (Pawelka 2002: 432). Its political culture is shaped by an 'absolute authority' around the central power of the *makhzan*, the monarchy and its hegemonic state apparatus, which has succeeded 'in converting allegiances into submission by creating a culture of obedience and stigmatizing any form of political dissent' (Zerhouni 2004: 62). The *makhzan* authority implies power concentration where delegation to lower levels simply denotes weakness. Line ministries thus tend to become separate centers of power with relatively high independence from central authority but weak delegation of competences to lower levels within ministries. Whereas officials at the top of ministries are likely to directly administrate the sovereign will, which 'requires absolute and unconditional loyalty' (Claisse 1987: 53), junior officials need permission from the ministry's secretary-general for every action taken. Although legally each citizen has the right of access to civil service jobs,¹¹ the huge bureaucratic apparatus is controlled by the head of state through the members of the elites recruited by him. This 'bureaucratic clientelism' (Pawelka 2002: 432) makes the officials particularly vulnerable to political pressure. Ministers have not only great discretion in management of human resources (Al-Arkoubi and McCourt 2004: 987), the legal texts exclude most senior appointments, which is why 'the highest and lowest levels of administration reflect the most traditional forms of patrimonialism whereas the intermediate level is evolving toward modernization' (Claisse 1987: 53).

Thus, officials at the intermediate level of the administrative hierarchy are controlled with more difficulty by the traditional means of *makhzenian* command. These officials made up the target group of this study as they present promising stakeholders for democratic change. To what extent do they consider democratic administrative rules and practices as appropriate modes of administrative governance?

Attitude toward Democratic Governance in Morocco's State Administration

A cursory glance at the descriptive statistics in Table 2 suggests that on average Moroccan state officials agree with democratic principles of administrative rules and practices: mean

¹¹ *Dahir* 1.58.008 from 24 February 1958 specified by the Royal decree 401.67 from 22 June 1967 and decree 2.04.23 from 4 May 2004.

and median are clearly located in the realm of positive attitude toward democratic governance.¹²

TABLE 2
ATTITUDE TOWARD DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF MOROCCAN OFFICIALS

	Participa- tion	Transpar- ency	Accountabil- ity	Democratic Govern- ance
Max. value	5	5	5	5
Min. value	1.3	1.7	1	1.3
Mean	4.48	4.64	4.26	4.46
Median	5	5	5	5
Standard devia- tion	.77	.67	.98	.81
Skewness	-1.712	-2.31	-1.455	-1.83

Descriptive statistics. *Values range between 1 (non-democratic) to 5 (democratic); N = 121, cases with missing values excluded listwise.*

Scales were constructed by adding the individual items' values and dividing the sum by the number of items for each dimension. Thus, each dimension and each item is treated as carrying the same weight. In order to estimate the scales' internal reliability, Raykov's confirmatory FA-based method is applied that is not only insensitive to violation of normality assumption but, most notably, is a more accurate estimate of scale reliability of multi-items measures than the usual Cronbach's coefficient alpha (though the value of the expressions are identical) (Brown 2006: 337-45, Raykov 1997, 2007, Sijtsma 2009). Raykov's approach uses factor loadings, error variances, and error covariances to calculate the proportion of a scale's true and error variance. The point estimate of the scale reliability (ρ) of participation is .79, that is 79 per cent of the total variance of participation is true score variance. For accountability and transparency, ρ is .58 and .75, respectively. The internal reliability is thus adequate for all subscales, in particular given the exploratory character of this study, its objective (attitudes and preferences), and the relatively small number per scale (John and Benet-Martínez 2000: 346).

Though democratic principles of governance are highly appreciated overall, we not only find differences between the three dimensions, but also between the individual items composing one dimension (see Annexes I to III). Moroccan state officials most value transparency as a democratic principle of governance. Only few officials completely disapprove of the idea of

¹² An online survey will be conducted with European bureaucrats from various member states in order to get a benchmark of agreement with democratic governance provisions.

sharing information with citizens, as the high minimum value and negative skewness denote. A closer look at the individual items reveals that no official rejects the principle that officials 'should work in a manner that is transparent and comprehensible for the general public' (min. = 3). Whereas more than 85 per cent of the respondents even strongly agree with this item (item 5; $M = 4.83$), officials are less convinced that they should be open toward citizens' views and provide information for anyone requesting it (items 7 and 8; $M = 4.49$ and 4.60 , respectively; $p = .000$ and $.002$, respectively). Though slightly disputed, the item 8 loads most powerfully on transparency ($r = .878$) and thus best embodies Moroccan state officials' understanding of transparency.

Public participation is also highly appreciated ($M = 4.48$), though it is more controversial than transparency as shown by higher standard deviation, weaker skewness and lower minimum average value. This dimension of democratic governance is mostly associated with item 3 ($r = .981$). More than 90 per cent agree that the views and concerns of affected citizens should be taken into account before making decisions ($M = 4.60$). No official rejects the notion that citizens should have an influence on shaping policies (item 6; $M = 4.44$). Item 4 largely mirrors this picture of a relatively high degree of agreement and moderate standard deviation as small differences in means between participation items indicate.

Accountability features lowest among the three dimensions of democratic governance. Nevertheless, on average officials agree that their actions should be justified to citizens and monitored by independent state institutions ($M = 4.26$). Nevertheless, opinion on the two accountability items is quite diverging. Whereas about half of the officials even strongly agree that public scrutiny and independent monitoring ensures procedural correctness of their actions, nearly ten per cent refuses to give any opinion on these issues (items 1 and 2; $M = 4.21$ and 4.31 , respectively). Moreover, these items show the highest degree of disagreement (about 5 %) and indifference ($> 10\%$), and above-average values on the neutral position.

Yet, the questionnaire also covers negatively oriented items that capture understandings distorting the meaning of democratic governance. Their analysis advises cautious interpretation of the overall high level of agreement and reveals the importance of the cognitive dimension of attitude toward democratic governance. Only if meaning and consequences of democratic governance features are fully understood, do their affective support becomes meaningful and possibly consequential.

The conflicting item to public participation addresses the authoritarian claim of unlimited approval: state officials ‘should always seek to bring the public into accordance with governmental policy’. This item reverses the direction of influence – citizens’ views should not shape, but are to be brought in line with governmental policies. That information of interest to the general public should be accessible to citizens directly threatens authoritarian thinking is embodied by the negatively framed transparency item: ‘A civil servant should ensure that information held by the public authority remains in the hands of the government only’. Finally, a third item addresses an attitude statement that distorts the meaning of accountability: ‘Instructions of, and approval by, the higher authority ensures the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts’.

TABLE III
ATTITUDE TOWARD NEGATIVELY ORIENTED ITEMS

	Max.*	Min.	Mean	Median	S.D.	Skewn.	1**	2	3	4	5	99
Participation	5	1	2.21	2	1.21	.900	35.3	25.3	21.3	3.3	6.7	8
Transparency	5	1	3.78	4	1.21	-.670	4	8.7	22.7	19.3	34.7	10.7
Accountability	5	1	2.94	3	1.25	.288	9.3	28.7	26	10	15.3	10.7
Total	5	1	2.98	3	1.22	.173	16.2	20.9	23.3	10.87	18.9	9.8

Descriptive statistics. * Values range from 1 (democratic) to 5 (non-democratic), Min. = Minimum value, Max. = Maximum value, S.D. = Standard Deviation; N = 107, cases with missing values excluded listwise. ** Answer categories range from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly), 99 stands for ‘don’t know’ / blank answers; N = 150; Frequencies in percentages.

Responses to the three negatively oriented items slightly relativize the officials’ attitude toward democratic governance (see Table 3). On average, they tend to oppose them ($M = 2.98$). Whereas more officials reject rather than accept the accountability and the participation item, more than 50 per cent of the officials agree with the reversed transparency item. At a first glance this contradicts the high degree of agreement with the positively oriented transparency items, especially with item 8 that states that officials should make information available to anyone requesting it. However, the statement contains the addendum ‘unless the information comes under certain specified exceptions’, which was obviously interpreted in a very broad sense. Thus, although Moroccan state officials tend to highly appreciate democratic governance, their understanding of some features is still partially rooted in an authoritarian culture of rule making. Strikingly, one third opted for the neutral position and about ten per cent refused to state its preference. Apparently, Moroccan state officials are caught between two logics of appropriateness: the traditional, authoritarian administrative culture and the Western/European conception of modern bureaucracy. Confronted with conflicting understandings, these officials do not know what definition of appropriateness to follow.

In sum, Moroccan state officials show a remarkably high degree of agreement with the attitude statements of democratic governance given that they are employed by an authoritarian regime hitherto reluctant to any noteworthy political liberalization. Interestingly, the degree of agreement differs between the three dimensions. Accountability of the state bureaucracy to the public is least approved. This is intuitively plausible since this dimension is also the most unfamiliar for state officials in authoritarian regimes and therefore probably the most difficult to fully comprehend. Whereas the core accountability items – monitoring by independent state institutions (item 1) and public scrutiny (item 2) – are unambiguously formulated, some transparency items seem to allow for broader interpretation as revealed by the analysis of the reversed item. Nevertheless, if one excludes the problematic item 8, approval remains the highest among the three dimensions, closely followed by participation. Apparently, the state officials dislike bureaucracy being reduced to a ‘service tool’ of the political leaders where ‘compliance with orders of the central authority is the mode of operation’ (Jreisat 2006: 417). Rather, they would appreciate public participation and transparency enabling decisions close to the concerns and interests of the people. How do state officials employed in a non-democratic environment come to appreciate these democratic elements of governance? Why do certain officials consider democratic governance as appropriate and others not? And to what extent do social and communication linkages to Europe impact on bureaucrats’ attitudes toward democratic modes of governance?

European Influences on Attitude toward Democratic Governance

The empirical analysis employs an original dataset of Moroccan state officials’ responses to a questionnaire on features of public administration. *Communication linkage* applies to Western print media (newspaper and magazines) and television channels that are used for political information. Media penetration is a categorical variable representing the frequency of usage Western media products: that is, no (1), occasional (2), and frequent (3) usage of Western media.¹³ Since media products predominantly originated in Europe – about 97 per cent of foreign print media and 94 per cent of foreign TV channels used – the expected influence of communication linkage can be said to be European. *Social linkage* refers to the officials’ international experiences operationalized as a stay abroad for at least six months for educational or professional reasons in the ‘old’ member states of the European Union and/or North America (NA). This variable is coded as a binary variable with a high value (2) for resi-

¹³ Respondents were asked to indicate which newspaper/magazines and television channels they read and watch for political information, in various languages, and how often they do so. 19.3 per cent reported no usage of European print and TV media, 11.3 per cent occasional and 63.3 per cent frequent usage; 6 per cent refused to answer this question.

dence in the EU and/or NA, and low value (1) when the person neither stayed abroad in Europe nor in the United States or Canada. There are no significant differences in attitude toward democratic governance between officials that spent a considerable period of time in Europe and those who had been in North America or in both host destinations as shown by the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test comparing the mean ranks for the three dimensions (df = 2; $\chi^2 = .310$, $p = .856$ for participation; $\chi^2 = 1.913$, $p = .384$ for accountability; $\chi^2 = .208$, $p = .901$ for transparency). Since the number of visitors to North America is very small (N = 9 only NA, N = 6 NA and EU), Europe and North America are subsumed. In total, 42 per cent of the respondents spent at least six months in Europe and/or North America. *Politicization* as relative proximity to a country's defense, security, and sovereignty, is not a yes-or-no property of a certain policy but a question of degree. It may rank from non-politicized (1) through politicized (2) to securitized (3) (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde 1998: 23-4). Since this survey does not cover state officials employed in securitized fields such as defense and external security, migration, and transnational crime, this variable is treated as binary. Less politicized fields cover the State Secretary of Water and Environment, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of National and Higher Education, and Scientific Research (N = 56). Departments of the Ministry of Economic and General Affairs, the Ministry of Economy and Exterior Finances, the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and New Technologies, the Ministry of Foreign Commerce, the Ministry of Agriculture, Rural Development and Fishing, and the Ministry of Equipment and Transport are coded as politicized (N = 84).¹⁴ For instance, touching upon internally sensitive issues such as corruption, patronage and the entwinement of private business with governmental responsibilities, competition policy, especially control of state aid, can be treated as politicized. Finally, *administrative socialization* is operationalized by the years of professional service under the 'new' King Mohammed VI, that is only service under the present regime (1), more years of service under the present regime than under the previous regime (2), or more years of service under the previous regime ruled by King Hassan II (3). With the ascension of Mohammed VI in 1999 a new spirit of political, social, and economic reform entered the country while, at the same time, the actual potential for meaningful democratic change remained limited (e.g., Zerhouni 2004).¹⁵

In order to assess the dependent variable – the state officials' attitude toward democratic governance – the individual dimensions' factor scores are used.¹⁶ The factor scores' determinacy – that is the correlation between the factor score estimates and the 'true' factor

¹⁴ To guarantee anonymity, I refer to the ministries rather than the individual departments since nearly all officials employed in the selected department responded, which would allow identifying them.

¹⁵ I reran the regression analysis for several alternative codings, e.g. age as proxy for length of service, and dummy for service under Hassan II. These analyses produce the same pattern of coefficients and p-values.

¹⁶ In MPlus the scores are estimated by an iterative technique using the regression method (modal posterior estimator) for categorical outcomes with WLSMV.

scores – is adequate for usage as dependent variables. Participation has a validity coefficient of .951, accountability of .869, and transparency of .905 (Brown 2006: 37, Grice 2001). The coefficient indicates how close the average estimate is to the true factor score, whereby a value close to 1 is desirable. The usage of factor scores allows for a more differentiated assessment of European influences on the officials' attitude toward the three different democratic core principles.

Multiple regression analysis examines the association of explanatory variables with each of the three democratic governance dimensions. Because of its robustness to non-normality of continuous data, the analysis is done with a Maximum Likelihood parameter estimator (MLMV) that provides estimates with standard errors and a mean- and variance-adjusted Chi-square test statistics (Brown 2006: 379). Social and communication linkage variables are regressed on the three democratic governance factors (linkage model), while controlling for the two alternative explanatory variables, politicization and administrative socialization, (full model I) and, additionally, for gender¹⁷ (full model II). In the control model, the two alternative explanatory variables are regressed alone on the democratic governance variables (I) and together with the demographic factors (II). Subsequent regression analyses will include the negatively oriented items and good governance items.

TABLE 4
IMPACT OF LINKAGE ON ATTITUDE TOWARD DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

	Linkage Model	Full Model I	Full Model II	Control Model I	Control Model II
Communicat. Linkage	-.111 (.095)	-.044 (.090)	-.035 (.094)		
Social Linkage	-.073 (.073)	-.055 (.094)	-.056 (.093)		
Politicization		-.230 (.082)**	-.231 (.081)**	-.215 (.080)**	-.214 (.079)**
Admin. Socialization		-.063 (.089)	-.052 (.091)	-.059 (.083)	-.044 (.084)
Gender			.061 (.090)		.095 (.083)
<i>R</i> ²	.019	.064	.067	.050	.058
<i>log likelihood</i>	-411.504	-509.118	-588.205	-298.302	-384.699
N	136	123	123	132	132

Multiple regression analysis. *Standardized regression coefficients displayed with standard error in parentheses; *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001.*

Table 4 presents the estimation results for the likelihood of shaping attitude toward democratic modes of administrative governance in general. The results reveal that the linkage vari-

¹⁷ Gender is expected to have a positive impact since women generally support political modernisation and democratization more strongly than men. Women generally expect to personally benefit in terms of more rights and freedom (e.g., Hegasy 2007: 31). 34.7 per cent of the state officials participating in this study's survey are women.

ables are not influential. In substantive terms this implies that the exposure to social and communication linkage does not shape the state officials' attitude toward democratic governance. By contrast, as expected, the domestic control factors have a significant negative impact. Apparently, the more the policy field in which a state official works is politicized, the lower his degree of agreement with participation items. However, administrative socialization does not matter, that is the attitude of state officials that experienced King Hassan II reign resembles the attitude of their younger colleagues. This finding is somewhat surprising since the new Moroccan generation is commonly perceived as supporting (political) modernization and individualization (e.g., Hegasy 2007). Gender also does not show any significant influence.

The findings of the regression on the factor scores' mean are mirrored by estimation results for linkages' likelihood of shaping attitude toward the individual dimensions. Again, the linkage variables do not show any significant effect for all three dimensions. Moreover, whereas politicization seems to be a significant factor, prior domestic socialization does not show any noteworthy effect on the agreement with democratic modes of administrative governance. Finally, there is no empirical evidence for differences in attitude between female and male officials (see Table 5 and 6).

TABLE 5
IMPACT OF LINKAGE ON ATTITUDE TOWARD PARTICIPATION

	Linkage Model	Full Model I	Full Model II	Control Model I	Control Model II
Communicat. Linkage	-.058 (.084)	-.073 (.086)	-.056 (.089)		
Social Linkage	-.067 (.088)	-.068 (.095)	-.070 (.095)		
Politicization		-.214 (.082)**	-.215 (.081)**	-.212 (.079)**	-.210 (.077)**
Admin. Socialization		-.065 (.092)	-.044 (.093)	-.083 (.083)	-.060 (.084)
Gender			.120 (.089)		.143 (.081)
<i>R</i> ²	.009	.063	.077	.051	.071
<i>log likelihood</i>	-635.585	-735.491	-810.162	-546.465	-627.795
<i>N</i>	136	123	123	132	132

Multiple regression analysis. *Standardized regression coefficients displayed with standard error in parentheses; *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001.*

TABLE 6
IMPACT OF LINKAGE ON ATTITUDE TOWARD TRANSPARENCY

	Linkage Model	Full Model I	Full Model II	Control Model I	Control Model II
Communicat. Linkage	-.018 (.085)	-.008 (.088)	.007 (.089)		
Social Linkage	-.018 (.086)	-.022 (.099)	-.024 (.099)		
Politicization		-.211 (.079)**	-.212 (.079)**	-.204 (.079)**	-.203 (.078)**
Admin. Socialization		-.030 (.099)	-.013 (.102)	-.008 (.086)	.016 (.088)
Gender			.098 (.087)		.146 (.081)
<i>R</i> ²	.001	.046	.055	.042	.062
<i>log likelihood</i>	-635.585	-735.491	-810.162	-546.465	-627.795
N	136	123	123	132	132

Multiple regression analysis. *Standardized regression coefficients displayed with standard error in parentheses; *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001.*

Interestingly, the results for accountability differ from those of the other two dimensions. Again, the likelihood that a state official agrees that her actions are to be justified to citizens and monitored by state institutions is not significantly affected by exposure to European media and/or personal experiences. In contrast to the other models, this time the domestic control factors are likewise hardly influential. Table 7 reports the estimation results for the likelihood of shaping agreement with accountability features of governance.

TABLE 7
IMPACT OF LINKAGE ON ATTITUDE TOWARD ACCOUNTABILITY

	Linkage Model	Full Model I	Full Model II	Control Model I	Control Model II
Communicat. Linkage	.008 (.086)	-.019 (.091)	-.030 (.093)		
Social Linkage	-.030 (.087)	-.036 (.094)	-.035 (.094)		
Politicization		-.126 (.083)	-.125 (.083)	-.092 (.082)	-.092 (.081)
Admin. Socialization		-.053 (.091)	-.066 (.092)	-.044 (.084)	-.055 (.085)
Gender			-.077 (.090)		-.065 (.086)
<i>R</i> ²	.001	.021	.027	.010	.014
<i>log likelihood</i>	-635.585	-735.491	-810.162	-546.465	-627.795
N	136	123	123	132	132

Multiple regression analysis. *Standardized regression coefficients displayed with standard error in parentheses; *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001.*

In sum, the findings indicate that transnational linkage does not shape the attitude toward democratic governance of state officials in Arab authoritarian regimes. Consequently, hypotheses 1 and 2 on the impact of social and communication linkage cannot be confirmed. In contrast to state-of-the-art theoretical work, strong ties to established democracies do not display any significant effect on the attitude toward democratic governance. Rather, domestic factors determine to what degree state officials consider participatory and transparent modes of governance as appropriate. The hypothesis that in high politics transfer of democratic governance via transnational channels is unlikely to occur can be confirmed. Interestingly, however, this variable turned out to be a factor of insignificant relevance for agreement with accountability features of governance. It seems as if the expectation that state officials are most reluctant to accept accountable action proves to be true.

Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to examine the effect of linkage to established democracies on the preferences of domestic actors in authoritarian regimes. Based on the theoretical assumption of the diffusion approaches to external democratization, it was hypothesized that domestic actors – here Moroccan state officials exposed to democratic governance via media penetration (communication linkage) and/or study visits abroad (social linkage) – are more likely to agree with democratic governance items. The descriptive analysis revealed that state officials indeed show a remarkably high degree of agreement despite being employed in a non-democratic polity. However, this agreement does not result from linkage. Rather, domestic factors such as the politicization of the policy field turned out to be the most significant factors, but in a negative direction. The more the policy field is politicized, the less state officials agree with democratic governance. Consequently, the question remains how state officials employed in a non-democratic environment come to appreciate democratic governance norms.

Two reasons may solve this puzzle. It might be that the responses do not reflect the state officials' 'true' attitude toward democratic governance but rather socially desirable behavior. Alternatively, external influences other than media penetration and international experience might account for the high agreement with democratic modes of governance.

Despite the precautions in questionnaire design and survey setting, some respondents might have 'conscious[ly] present[ed ...] a false front' by 'deliberately falsifying test responses to create favorable impressions' (Zerbe and Paulhus 1987: 253). 'Impression management' as one specific type of socially desirable responding seeks the approval of the reference group. It is conceivable that respondents agree with items commonly associated with European

thinking and disagree with those Europeans are assumed to dismiss.¹⁸ However, even if we found evidence for socially desirable response behavior, cognitive learning processes apparently took place, which means that respondents at least learnt what kind of governance Europeans seem to acknowledge as appropriate administrative rules. Consequently, European standards of administrative governance were apparently accepted as an appropriate standard. If not from European media or study visits abroad, how do state officials become acquainted with democratic governance?

Interestingly, many state officials surveyed were/are involved in technical assistance programs. For instance, 56 per cent of the officials participate(d) in the EU's Twinning program, a particular tool for cooperation between a sub-unit of public administration in a neighboring country and the equivalent institution in an EU member state. This program aims at making available the (administrative) expertise and (technical) know-how of practitioners from Europe to public administrations in third states. Since Twinning projects are characterized by intensive working relations between state officials, they might be particularly suited for the triggering of processes of attitudinal change. An analysis of their effect on the attitude toward democratic governance of the involved third state officials seems to be a promising target for future research.

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¹⁸ Social desirability response behaviour will be statistically controlled by computing an index as the relative number of scores given on the most socially desirable option of items with social desirability connotations that have been identified with the help of cognitive pre-tests. These responses are counted and divided by the number of items resulting in a social desirability index ranging from 0 to 1, with 0 meaning the least social desirable option (Van Herk, Poortinga and Verhallen 2004: 351). The effect of social desirability will be tested by a Chi-square test with dependent variables.

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ANNEX I

ATTITUDE TOWARD INDIVIDUAL ITEMS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

Items	Max.*	Min.	Mean	S.D.	Skewness	1**	2	3	4	5	99
Factor I Participation	5	1.3	4.48	.769	-1.712	1.2	1.34	8	26.42	57.2	5.84
3 'A civil servant should take into account the views and concerns of affected citizens before making decisions'	5	1	4.60	.737	-2.622	1.3	0.7	2.7	23.3	68.7	3.3
4 'A civil servant should offer updated information on governmental policy'	5	1	4.40	.831	-1.478	0.7	2	9.3	26.7	54	7.3
6 'A civil servant should ensure that the citizens' views and concerns have an influence on shaping policies'	5	2	4.44	.740	-1.036	0	0.7	10.7	26.7	56.7	5.3
Factor II Transparency	5	1.7	4.64	.668	-2.31	0.9	1.3	5.13	17.8	71.57	3.3
5 'A civil servant should work in a manner that is transparent and comprehensible for the general public'	5	3	4.83	.435	-2.699	0	0	2	10.7	85.3	2
7 'A civil servant should provide citizens with the possibility of advancing their views as an input for governmental decision-making'	5	1	4.49	.708	-1.743	0.7	1.3	4	32.7	57.3	4
8 'A civil servant should make information available to anyone requesting it'	5	1	4.60	.861	-2.477	1.4	2.7	4.7	14	74.7	2.7
Factor III Accountability	5	1.2	4.26	.98	-1.455	1.46	2.4	9.86	27.62	52.14	6.52
1 'Monitoring by independent state institutions ensures the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts'	5	1	4.21	1.056	-1.417	3.3	2	13.3	22.7	49.3	9.3
2 'Possibilities for the general public and its associations to request scrutiny of decision-making process and review of policies ensures the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts'	5	1	4.31	.904	-1.493	2	2.7	10	28.7	46.7	10

Descriptive statistics. *Values range from 1 (non-democratic) to 5 (democratic), Min. = Minimum value, Max. = Maximum value, S.D. = Standard Deviation; N = 121, cases with missing values excluded listwise. **Answer categories range from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly), 99 stands for 'don't know' / blank answers; N = 150; Frequencies in percentages.

ANNEX II


DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDE TOWARD INDIVIDUAL ITEMS

Participation			Transparency			Accountability		
Item Pairs	Mean	Sign.	Item Pairs	Mean	Sign.	Item Pairs	Mean	Sign.
Item 3 – item 4	.207	.013	item 5 – item 7	.328	.000	item 1 – item 2	-.129	.247
Item 3 – item 6	.138	.042	item 5 – item 8	.250	.002			
Item 4 – item 6	-.069	.426	item 7 – item 8	-.078	.408			

Dependent sample t-test. $N = 116$; Mean = differences in mean between two items, cases with missing values excluded listwise.

ANNEX III

COMPARISON OF ATTITUDE TOWARD INDIVIDUAL ITEMS



Histogram. Bars represent single items' mean of agreement; black bars show dimensions' average; $N = 121$, cases with missing values excluded listwise.

ANNEX IV

CROSS-TABULATION OF LINKAGE VARIABLES

		Social Linkage			Kendall's τ
		No stay abroad	Stay abroad	Total	
Communication Linkage	European media	No usage	19	10	29
		Occasional usage	12	5	17
		Frequent usage	50	42	92
	Total	81	57	138	.113 (.161)

Contingency table. One-tailed p-value of Kendall's τ coefficients in parentheses.